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Introduction
In the discussion on the background causes of political 
violence, economistic approaches currently predomi-
nate. Since François Jean and Jean-Christoph Rufin drew 
attention to “the economy of civil wars” in their anthol-
ogy around ten years ago, there has been a steady stream 
of empirical studies and attempts to conceptualize this 
topic (Jean and Rufin 1999; Eppler 2002; Elwert 1997; 
Kurtenbach and Lock 2004). People have rediscovered the 
scheming warlord, who uses violence without hesitation 
for purposes of enrichment, have talked about the “priva-
tization” of violence and the emergence of “markets of 
violence,” and have seen “shadow globalization” as a main 
driving force of armed conflicts. In line with this trend, 
the World Bank presented an analysis of civil wars that 
drew much attention, highlighting “greed” as their central 
cause (Collier and Hoeffler 2001; Collier et al. 2003).
My intention is not to dispute the sense of and justification 
for all these efforts. In an increasingly secularized world, 
material motives for social acts obviously gain significance, 
both in general terms and specifically where the use of 
violence is concerned. Yet I wonder whether the pursuit 
of economic advantage and power is in itself a sufficient 
explanation for violent phenomena. Particularly when 
violent conflicts and crimes of violence become a perma-
nent characteristic of a society, there is much to suggest 
that they are anchored in that society’s culture (as previ-
ously Waldmann 1997). A case study, Colombia, will be 
used to test this hypothesis. There are at least two reasons 
to believe that Colombia is a suitable test case for proving 
the existence of a culture of violence:
•  The first is the enduringly high level of violence in that 
country. Due not least to the vigorous security policy 
adopted by incumbent President Alvaro Uribe, the 
annual homicide rate has declined markedly since the 
early 1990s, when it peaked at more than 70 per 100,000 
inhabitants. Nonetheless, it remains alarmingly high 
by international comparison, at more than 50 deaths 
per 100,000 inhabitants. (See for example Fundacion 
Seguridad y Democracia 2004, 5 ff., 57 ff. For detailed 
data see Appendix.)
•  The second reason for choosing Colombia is that the 
hypothesis that there is a culture of violence and the 
existence of other, especially material, motives for the 
use of coercion and violence are not necessarily mutu-
ally exclusive. All experts agree that the most recent 
upsurge of violence in Colombia, which began in the 
1980s, has its origins largely in the narcotics trade 
(Richani 1997). Thus one could argue that if a culture 
of violence can be proven as an additional causal factor 
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even in Colombia – where the relevance of economic 
motives to the spread of violence is beyond doubt – this 
would strongly support the idea that such a culture of 
violence is an important factor in other violent conflicts 
where material interests are of lesser importance.
How should one approach a difficult subject like this, how 
to form an empirically substantiated judgment about the 
Colombian population’s proneness to and acceptance 
of violence? To arrive at reliable results one would have 
to conduct a comparative analysis of opinion polls and 
carry out extensive analyses of the coverage of Colombian 
newspapers and magazines. The author has neither the 
time nor the resources for this. What he can offer is a few 
tentative ideas and conclusions that might help to open up 
this topic, which so far has been little explored. In doing 
so, in addition to his own observations and experience, he 
draws on a careful reading of selected works by (mostly 
Colombian) colleagues who have concerned themselves, in 
some cases for decades, with violence in Colombia and are 
therefore far better acquainted with the underlying norms, 
taboos, and unspoken assumptions than it is possible for 
an “outsider” to be.
When we speak of a culture of violence in a country, we 
must first clarify what we mean by the term. This es-
say therefore starts by considering whether and how the 
concept of a “culture of violence in society” can be defined 
and operationalized. There follows a discussion of some 
empirical findings that suggest that elements of a culture 
of violence do actually exist in Colombia. Thirdly, it looks 
in more detail at two extreme forms of violence, the mas-
sacre and the sicariato.1 This is followed by an attempt to 
identify some structural conditions that are responsible for 
the emergence of a culture of violence. A brief comment 
assessing the importance of cultural factors within the 
context of other factors explaining violence rounds off the 
article.
It will become clear that while a culture of violence plays 
an important role as an underlying condition for currently 
observable manifestations of violence, it is also a phe-
nomenon that is itself dependent on historical and social 
factors.
On the Concept of a “Culture of Violence”
To put it simplistically, we can use a relatively broad 
concept of a culture of violence, or one that is reduced to 
its core content. In the broader sense, a culture of violence 
includes all socio-cultural structures and symbols that 
are connected with, produced by, and perpetuate violence. 
Obviously, in a country like Colombia with a history of 
civil wars and violence that goes back roughly 150 years, 
almost every aspect of life has been shaped and marked by 
this in one way or another. That is the principal theme of 
Daniel Pécaut, who asserts that violence has given rise to 
a peculiarly Colombian system of order (Pécaut 1987, es-
pecially part two). In addition to numerous illegal violent 
actors, counteracted in the sphere of legality by the state 
security forces and legal private security services, this 
system includes a highly complex network of coalitions 
and confrontations between these actors, along with never-
ending negotiations of pacts and compromises (often of 
only limited duration from the outset or later broken). It 
also features a market order adulterated by pressure and 
coercion and a legal system devoid of its enforcement 
component, that is, essentially amputated. Pécaut says 
that violence and coercion are now fixed components of 
Colombia’s social and political machinery and can no 
longer be simply removed from it (Pécaut 2001, 91). This 
means that, along with all social sub-systems, violence too 
is constantly replicated in that country. 
This broad concept of a culture of violence is not very 
helpful because basically it amounts to the trivial assertion 
that violence and coercion, as constantly employed means 
of enforcement, have created their own social and insti-
tutional environment that supports them and keeps them 
alive. It appears more interesting and less tautological to 
ask whether specific factors in the collective consciousness, 
such as certain ideas of values and norms, contribute to-
1 A sicario is a [hired] assassin. For a more 
detailed explanation of the term, see the section 
entitled “Extreme Forms of Violence: Massacres 
and Sicarios” below. 
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wards the persistence of violence; that is, whether cultural 
makeup in the narrower sense – understood as the general 
view of what is desirable, worthwhile, and normatively 
acceptable – is responsible for the difficulties of putting a 
stop to escalating violence.2 If we focus on the problem in 
this way, we immediately have to add two brief explana-
tions that will help us to come to a realistic conclusion.
First, “subcultures of violence” must be differentiated from 
a generally prevalent culture of violence in society. Violent 
subcultures that depart from the prevailing consensus 
on norms and values in society exist all over the world. 
However, they have come to attention especially in mod-
ern industrial societies such as the United States.3 These 
subcultures are usually confined to particular parts of the 
cities and are found among adolescents from the poorer 
classes with limited opportunities for social advancement 
and success. This leads them to adopt an attitude of resis-
tance and protest against society in general, and especially 
against the middle and upper classes. The swift, spontane-
ous recourse to violence as a means of enforcement that is 
widespread in these subcultural formations is not least an 
expression of this protest and of distance from established 
society. The idea presupposes the existence of largely non-
violent spaces, whence the description “subcultures” of 
violence that are by no means representative of the society 
as a whole.
However, it is a fundamentally different matter to put 
forward the hypothesis that a widespread acceptance of 
violent methods of conflict resolution exists in society as 
a whole. Unlike violence-oriented subcultures in which 
reference to coercion and violence often creates a sense of 
identity, modern societies as entities virtually never sub-
scribe to a basic attitude that is pro-violence or promotes 
violence. There are two reasons for this. First, in modern 
nations it is assumed that the state has a monopoly on 
the exercise of violence. If in fact the state has failed to 
monopolize violence, this circumstance is played down 
and presented as a temporary state of affairs that can be 
resolved. In this there are undertones of the not unjusti-
fied idea that for modern societies based on a division of 
functions, arbitrary exercise of violence by individuals or 
organized groups, unless a marginal phenomenon, might 
represent a stress factor with which society would be 
unable to cope for long. If the “war of every man against 
every man” in the Hobbesian sense were an obstacle to 
the functioning of even primitive societies, that war, if it 
persisted, would lead developed societies to the brink of 
collapse.
The second reason why the political and social representa-
tives of modern societies will be reluctant to admit that 
unchecked exercise of violence by citizens is the order of 
the day in their countries has to do with the current inter-
national rules of political correctness. NGOs that spe-
cialize in monitoring human rights violations have now 
assumed a kind of international watchdog and control 
function. In these circumstances, if the representatives 
or the media of a country spoke too often about violence 
as a customary means of enforcement there, this would 
amount to voluntary character assassination of that nation. 
Their frankness would be punished, and the country in 
question and its representatives would be stigmatized and 
relegated to the margins of the international community.
My line of argument boils down to the conclusion that – 
unlike in the case of violent subcultures – where violent 
practices are accepted by society as a whole, we should not 
expect any open avowal or forthright justification of such 
practices. Instead, to track down such patterns of accep-
tance or a normatively approved disposition toward the 
use of violence we will have to look for indirect or covert 
indications. Often, the facts of violence speak eloquently 
for themselves. To find out something about how they are 
supported by and embedded in a culture, we are well ad-
2 Culture in a comprehensive, general sense is to 
be understood as the “complex whole that includes 
knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom and 
practice and all other activities and habits that the 
individual has acquired as a member of the soci-
ety” (see Nohlen 2005, p. 503). In this article,
a narrower concept of culture is preferred. This 
takes into consideration the prevailing ideas as to 
values and norms on the one hand and the gener-
ally accepted habitual modes of behavior that these 
give rise to on the other.
3 On the following see for example Albrecht 2003 
and Kühnel 2003. The classical work on this topic 
is Wolfgang and Ferracuti 1969.
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vised to pay less attention to statements that refer directly 
to coercion and violence, and more to exploring the con-
ceptual and ideological settings in which they are made. 
There is in fact a general sociological argument supporting 
this more indirect approach. Sociological system theorists 
realized quite early that a society’s central value premises 
and norm orientations are by no means continuously 
emphasized. Rather, they tend to be mentioned in passing 
precisely because they are unquestioned matters of course. 
Not by accident did Talcott Parsons, the best-known 
system theoretician of the 1950s and 1960s, describe the 
strategy for maintaining the social value base as “latent 
pattern maintenance” (Parsons 1951, 26ff.; 1967, esp. 165). 
What he meant was that values have the greatest impact if 
they remain latent and are accepted unquestioningly and 
unspokenly. If they come under discussion or are explicitly 
asserted and avowed in a society, as a rule this is not proof 
of a society that is keenly aware of its values, but rather 
betrays insecurity and a crisis of values.
As regards the problem of a culture of violence in Co-
lombian society in general, it would therefore probably 
be futile to seek clear, positive evidence of an affirmation 
of recourse to violence for whatsoever purpose. At best, 
one might expect tacit tolerance of coercive methods. To 
reiterate, indirect indicators around the topic of violence 
should be no less helpful than indicators referring directly 
to violence in providing evidence of this.
Indicators of a Culture of Violence
We can identify three types of indicators that point to a 
culture of violence. These are structural indicators that 
arise from the nature of violence in Colombia (frequency, 
intensity, etc.); mental indicators that suggest that there is 
a widespread propensity to violence; and a lack of taboos 
and prohibitive rules that would limit the use of violence.
Among the structural factors concerning violence itself 
we must mention first its ubiquity in this country. There 
is hardly a single social sphere, geographical location, or 
group that has been spared it for any longer period. Be 
it in the cities or remote rural areas, the social micro-
sphere of the family or the macrosphere of politics, the 
lower, middle, or upper class, the judiciary or any busi-
ness sector, violence is everywhere. Certainly, it occurs 
in different escalatory sequences and forms. Yet it would 
be wrong to conclude that different forms of violence 
were based on different causal origins. On the contrary, 
if people resort to physical coercion in all conceivable 
situations for all possible ends, the obvious conclusion is 
that they must share an underlying disposition that gives 
rise to this standard approach. And how would such a 
pervasive underlying disposition come into being if not 
by way of attitudinal patterns that are ultimately cultur-
ally determined ?4
Another circumstance suggests that there is a propensity 
to violence that is socioculturally anchored in the widest 
sense. This is the multiplicity of collective violent actors 
and their routinized modus operandi. Certainly, one 
encounters groups that take the law into their own hands 
and kill people at will in other Latin American countries, 
too. The striking thing about Colombia is that a host of 
organizations and groupings operate outside the law and 
employ coercion and violence in pursuit of their aims.5 In 
doing so, they generally operate in a way that is both cold-
blooded and professional. This professionalism is partly 
the result of mutual imitation and learning processes. For 
example, it is obvious that the paramilitary forces learned 
mainly from the guerrilla organizations, which already 
had years of previous involvement in partisan struggle 
and dubious sources of funding before the paramilitar-
ies came into existence. In any case, the development of 
a wide range of techniques of violence, whether based on 
personal experience or adopted from others, presupposes 
a sociocultural ambience that does not stigmatize the un-
authorized use of violence but accepts it as one of several 
ways of attaining esteem and success.
4 The only alternative would be the anthropologi-
cal hypothesis that “the Colombian” has an innate 
propensity to violence, which I consider to be 
nonsense. On this complex see Waldmann 1997, 
143 f., 155 ff.
5 Ibid., 144 ff. See also Sánchez 2001, 10: “… what 
is remarkable in Colombia is the extraordinary 
diversity of violence.”
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As the final structural indicator for the probable existence 
of a culture of violence, the frequency and ease with which 
a transition from “simple,” rationally comprehensible acts 
of violence to violent excesses takes place in this country 
should be mentioned. Extreme forms of violence and their 
sociocultural significance are dealt with in a separate 
section below. Here it will suffice to note that a glaring dis-
crepancy between the brutality of means and the modesty 
of the ends pursued, along with torture, the mutilation of 
corpses, and the like, are by no means exceptional in this 
country, but an everyday occurrence. Such excesses, which 
in individual cases can escalate into orgies of violence, are 
only possible in the context of a society in which the taboo 
limiting the unauthorized use of violence has not only 
been broken but, in some social groups and sectors, has 
been practically removed and replaced by a cult of annihi-
lation of enemies.
The annihilation of enemies is the cue for moving on 
to the second complex of indicators, the way in which 
violence-promoting patterns of thinking and emotive 
concepts are anchored in the collective consciousness: 
first and foremost the friend-foe dichotomy that enjoys 
a central place in the Colombian realm of imagination, 
in all social classes. (On the emergence of the friend-foe 
culture in the nineteenth century see Krumwiede 1980, 
87 ff.; Uribe 2004, 43ff., 62 ff., 124 f. etc.). Originally associ-
ated with the rivalry between the two traditional political 
parties, conservatives and liberals, thinking in terms of 
friend and foe has now become a matter of course and 
permeates social discourse on all social planes, from mi-
cro to macro. There is no urban district, region, or village 
without a sworn enmity between two or three main actors, 
be they individuals, family clans, or organized groups, 
that shapes the life of society and compels the remaining 
actors to take sides and fall into line. Even in new settle-
ments founded by war refugees far away from the central 
civil war action, the well-known pattern of division is 
reproduced almost automatically, resulting before long in 
confrontations and moves by mutually hostile groups to 
disassociate themselves from one another.6
According to Gonzalo Sánchez, in Colombia, the histori-
cal continuity with which enmities are cultivated and war 
is repeatedly waged is on its own sufficient to identify the 
existence of a culture of violence. Massacres, abductions, 
the circulation of lists of victims before the actual act of 
violence is committed, and the key role played by inform-
ers are not new phenomena spawned by the most recent 
wave of violence but patterns of behavior and role models 
that can be traced back far into the past (Sánchez 2003, 
36, 83ff.). What is remarkable, he says, is that these have 
survived almost unchanged through the transition from 
a primarily rural to a highly urbanized social structure 
and the associated radical transformation in values from 
a highly religious to a largely secularized society. This, he 
says, can only be explained by their being firmly anchored 
in Colombians’ cultural memory.
The friend-foe model as a pattern of perception is fre-
quently overlaid by a quasi-moral discourse about honor 
and the need to retaliate, along the lines of “tit for tat.” 
Many young men are unable to forget that they lost their 
fathers in an arbitrary act of violence. Even if they do not 
know the killers, the recollection of this crime is stored in 
their memory and fills them with a dull, aimless hatred 
that can discharge at random. Killing someone because of 
an insult to one’s honor is not only considered legitimate 
but is essential in some groups and circles if one wishes to 
avoid jeopardizing one’s reputation (Uribe 1992, 54 ff.).
A further consequence of dividing the social environment 
into friends and enemies is the tendency to be intolerant 
and Manichean, to think in categories of black and white 
and to disdain nuances and compromises. On the one 
hand, this leads people to seek the solution to problems in 
direct confrontation with the opponent (or, if an impasse 
is reached, in direct negotiations with him), that is, to 
6 For example Maria V. Uribe and Teófilo Vásquez 
give an impressive description of how fighting 
flared up between the supporters of different party 
factions and other groups in the Departamento 
Meta resettlement zone (Uribe and Vásquez 1995,
49ff ). The author knows from his own experience, 
too, that the various districts on the outskirts of 
Bogotá constitute a microcosm that faithfully 
reflects the conflict situation characteristic of the 
entire country.
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reject outside mediation, whether by an arbitrator or in 
court. On the other, it casts a dubious light on all those 
who fail to clearly take the side of one party or the other. 
As a bandit interviewed by Victoria Uribe once said: “I’d 
like to have two hearts, one for the good people and one 
for the bad.” Asked who the “bad” were, he said, “Those 
who don’t attack their enemies. They are dangerous trai-
tors.” (Ibid., 25) The traitor, the alleged or actual informer 
(“sapo”), and the collaborator are established figures in the 
realm of collective imagination, and they are directly con-
nected with the rigid friend-foe pattern. The sinister aspect 
of the social labeling processes that these figures give rise 
to is that they proceed in a largely uncontrolled and arbi-
trary fashion, so that any outsider runs the risk of being 
given one of these labels that can then cost his or her life.
A second pattern of behavior that promotes the arbitrary 
use of violence is the macho cult that is widespread in 
Colombia and, closely linked to it, the tolerance of a ruth-
less individualism that shirks no means of enforcement. 
Uribe observed the version of this reverence for imperious, 
brutal individuals that is customary in rural regions when 
she visited a cemetery in southern Colombia. She found 
that special deference was paid to people who had gained 
reputations as cruel butchers and inhuman monsters dur-
ing their lifetime (Uribe 2004, 16). Studies on the Violen-
cia period, too, describe how gang and guerrilla leaders 
who committed repeated massacres not only inspired fear 
and terror among the peasants, but were also admired by 
them (Sánchez and Meertens 1983, 53).
The modern version of the self-confident macho who 
shows no scruples as he works his way up is the shrewd 
businessmen, or someone like Pablo Escobar who came 
from humble beginnings and succeeded in rising to be-
come head of a famous and notorious drug cartel and be-
came popular with the general public not least on account 
of his generous donations. In the end, it was not so much 
the use of violence balking at no human sacrifice that 
sealed his fate, as the fact that he developed further-reach-
ing ambitions and planned to culminate an essentially 
criminal career legally by standing for parliament.7
Generally, on perusing the literature in search of mo-
tives and attitudes that stimulate violence, one gains the 
impression that broad strata of Colombia society have 
little regard for either life or death (Uribe 1992, 94: «… lo 
que menos cuesta, desde luego, es la vida …»). Evidence 
is plentiful that people are very generous with the lives 
of others (and sometimes also with their own). Take, for 
example, the small sums for which sicarios are prepared to 
kill any stranger, the frequent massacres, the kidnappings 
that not infrequently end in the death of the kidnapped 
person, the fact that homicide is the most common cause 
of death among young men between the ages of 15 and 35, 
and much more besides. Yet this disregard for life some-
how extends to death as well. Only that explains why in 
the Violencia period, the mutilation and desecration of 
corpses was nothing unusual, or why after massacres the 
dead were (and still are) often left lying on the ground or 
buried hastily in a pit, that is, without any kind of funeral 
rite. Now, when sicarios ordain that when they die there 
should be no lamentation and no funeral service, but that 
their friends and relations should mark the occasion by 
holding a party with music, dancing, and alcohol, this, 
too, reflects a banalization of their demise (Osorno 1993, 
126f.). It is as if they were saying, “Don’t worry about my 
and your future, all that counts is the moment, the pres-
ent, which should be made as eventful and pleasurable as 
possible.”
A third set of factors encouraging the spread of a culture 
of violence is the lack of restrictive taboos and informal 
sanctions against the unauthorized use of violence. This 
shortcoming is apparent in Colombia in the way the sub-
ject of violence is treated, both generally in public discus-
sion and in relation to specific individuals.8 First, as far as 
general discussion, in public and especially in the mass 
7 On the cult of the macho see Borda 1999, 20: „In 
Kolumbien blüht ein hemmungsloser Kult des 
starken Mannes …“ See also Restrepo 2001, 98: 
“There predominates in Colombia an extreme in-
dividualism. … Each individual confronts society 
as if it were a menacing jungle.”
8 Restrepo 2001, 98: “… I do not believe that … 
there exists a spontaneous and permanent inclina-
tion toward the exercise of force … Instead, I 
believe that we share a ‘culture of social indiffer-
ence toward violence.’”
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media, is concerned, the absence of systematic efforts 
to criticize and delegitimize the illegal use of violence is 
striking. It may be possible to explain this as a reaction 
of fatigue to the never-ending series of hold-ups, kidnap-
pings, and murders, and it may reflect a certain resigna-
tion and submission to the inevitable. Anyhow, the fact 
is that the media only adopt a critical tone in exceptional 
cases of particularly brutal or spectacular acts of violence. 
They are more preoccupied with and pay more attention 
to the conflict narrative than to the use of violence. They 
warn against possible further escalation and polarization, 
speak about an increased willingness to negotiate and 
compromise on all sides, and give expression to the gen-
eral longing for peace by calling for an end to the hostili-
ties. However, they hardly question the use of violence as 
such, which is the mode in which the conflict is played out.
This has two consequences. Since acts of violence are 
reported only in a routine tone, no public discussion takes 
place about the extent to which they can be described as 
fair or unfair, courageous or cowardly, legitimate or ille-
gitimate. Whether certain minimum rules of engagement 
were adhered to, whether the violence is directed at inno-
cents or combatants, whether people are attacked frontally 
or shot dead from behind, is all seemingly uninteresting 
(Sánchez 2003, 121). The only thing that matters is the 
outcome of the fighting. Who won, who is the victor in a 
zone, who must vacate it? The second consequences is that 
fixing attention on negotiations and a possible peace deal 
leads to past injustice being largely blanked out and played 
down (Ibid., 61). Somehow, the inflation of illegal acts of 
violence and the swift forgetting of them are two sides of 
the same coin. Where all hope is directed toward an early 
end to a violent conflict, little space is left for reviewing, 
analyzing, and expiating past crimes. Naturally, dispens-
ing with punitive justice involves the risk that some time 
later the violent monster, which has been lulled by a peace 
deal but by no means stripped of its lethal claws, will 
reawaken and strike.
These general comments also apply to a large extent to the 
way the careers of individual violent actors are seen from 
the point of view of the general public. In this case, too, it 
is primarily the outcome that counts, the demonstrable 
success, and not the path, the dubious means, that led to 
it. That someone ordered or committed a murder does not 
necessarily turn out to be a hindrance to a career in poli-
tics or elsewhere. True, criminal law says that murder must 
be punished, but the judiciary is corruptible. Even in the 
unlikely case that sentence were to be passed, the possibil-
ity of a pardon would still beckon (Rubio 1999, 33ff., 199ff.).
My deliberations so far can be summarized as follows: The 
unauthorized use of violence in Colombia is neither an 
emphasized right nor a generally decried outrage. Basi-
cally, there is no public discourse on violence. People are 
generally aware of it primarily because it is constantly, and 
not infrequently excessively, perpetrated. This in turn is 
only possible because of a widespread tacit tolerance and 
acceptance of the use of physical force to solve private 
and social problems, an attitude that one can certainly 
describe as a culture of violence. This is based on mental 
stereotypes and models that stimulate aggression and 
independent, unauthorized enforcement on the one hand 
and on the absence of taboos and informal norms that 
inhibit or limit violence on the other.
Extreme Forms of Violence: Massacres and Sicarios
The two forms of violence referred to in the heading differ 
from one another in their processes and the aims they 
serve. Massacres spread terror and are a form of show 
of strength, while the sicario, or contract killer, offers 
violence as a service for sale. However, as we will see, they 
have a number of features in common, the most important 
of which is that they constitute extreme forms and each 
carry a specific motive for violence to its extreme. They 
are included here on the assumption that extremes and 
excesses are neither alien to nor untypical of the societies 
involved, but definitely say something about their normal 
constitution and the attitudes of the average citizen.9 Here 
a brief outline of each of these two forms of violence, is 
followed by an exploration of the structural features they 
have in common and their significance in a wider social 
context.
Acts of violence in which more than four people die are 
termed massacres. (On the following see especially Uribe 
and Vásquez 1995; Uribe 1992; 2004.) The dead may be a 
family, a youth group, or an entire village. Sometimes the 
number of victims can run into hundreds. Back in the 
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days of La Violencia, Colombia was already the scene of 
numerous massacres committed by a wide range of groups. 
This horrendous practice was revived during the course 
of the most recent wave of violence. The death squads 
and paramilitaries in particular have a reputation for 
spreading fear and terror by means of selective massacres. 
Victoria Uribe counted a total of 1,230 massacres during 
the period from 1980 to 1998. She differentiates between 
massacres with economic, social, and political aims, but 
regardless of the specific aim the fact remains that mas-
sacres are first and foremost an extreme demonstration of 
strength by means of violence.
Massacres often follow a specific sequence of events (Uribe 
2004, 88 ff.). They do not befall the unsuspecting victims 
out of the blue but announce themselves, or are announced, 
through vague rumors, threats, and forewarnings. The 
collective act of violence often takes place in the evening, 
when the inhabitants of a farm, several houses, or a village 
are surprised over supper or when engaging in some other 
communal activity. Not infrequently, the attackers wear 
uniform, and they are always heavily armed. In the coun-
tryside, the targeted group of houses is often surrounded 
so that no-one can escape. All the occupants are then 
herded into the central square and a list of names provided 
by informers is read out. The accused, usually men, are 
singled out and taken elsewhere. Shots and cries of pain 
signal to the remaining villagers that these men have been 
butchered. When the attackers have made off and the 
survivors make their way to the scene of the murderous 
events, what awaits them is a heap of lifeless, often badly 
disfigured, corpses. In an isolated settlement it can be days 
before neighbors notice that a massacre has taken place.
In addition to this “normal” pattern there are versions 
involving even greater cruelty. Sometimes, the butchers 
take their time and torture victims before killing them. 
While women and children are generally spared, there are 
instances of women being raped and children being killed 
to prevent the possibility of revenge (when they grow up). 
During La Violencia it was customary to cut the dead into 
pieces like slaughtered animals or to mutilate and disfig-
ure them in quasi-ceremonial fashion (Ibid., 72 ff.).
The violence of the sicarios, on the other hand, usually 
takes the form of assassinations of individuals rather 
than large-scale carnage. In cities, victims are generally 
attacked with firearms from the back of a motorcycle. 
(On this and the following see Osorno 1993; Salazar 
1990; Sánchez 2001, 7 ff. On the phenomenon of criminal 
juvenile gangs in Central America see Peetz 2004.) The 
killer, riding behind the driver, aims for the victim’s head 
because he can only be sure of receiving his money if 
the victim dies an instant death. Sicarios are young men 
between the ages of 15 and 25 – working in groups – who 
specialize in earning their money from contract killings. 
The institution of contract killing originated in Medel-
lin but has now spread to most Colombian cities. Yet the 
gangs of young men who actually perform the violent 
business are only the tools of people behind the scenes 
who organize and coordinate the entire action. These may 
be individuals, but often an agency is behind the attacks. 
These agencies – which are disguised to a greater or lesser 
degree depending on their geographical location and 
social affiliation – act as mediators between the “custom-
ers” and the sicarios who perform their murderous wishes. 
They arrange the assassination contract, fix the fee (usually 
payable in advance) in line with the anticipated difficulties 
(for instance, if someone is heavily guarded), and identify 
among the gangs of young killers which is best suited to 
undertake the violent transaction in question.
Every sicario’s dream is to be hired for a “mega attack” 
that would allow him and his family to live without wor-
ries about the future. Yet his wages are only a fraction of 
the sum paid for the contract killing. The lion’s share goes 
to middlemen and people behind the scenes who prepare 
the assassination and ensure its smooth execution. Al-
9 Three arguments support this hypothesis. First, 
those who commit the excesses are not social 
deviants but represent an average type, at least in 
certain social groups and classes. Second, they do 
not act in isolation but, as will be seen, are embed-
ded in a wider context of social planning and 
organization. Third and last, the wider public’s 
calm reaction to the crimes enables them to be, if 
not approved, at least ultimately accepted.
70IJCV : Vol. 1 ( 1) 2007, pp. 61–75Peter Waldmann: Is There a Culture of Violence in Colombia
though sicarios are prepared to commit any violent act for 
money, one cannot describe them and the subculture they 
form as materialistic in the narrow sense. This subculture 
includes its own language, a love of certain types of film 
and rock music, dance, narcotics consumption, black hu-
mor, and a fundamentally macho attitude featuring a cult 
of weapons and motorcycles. Sicarios do not reject loyalties 
and ties out of hand. They venerate the Virgin Mary and of-
ten idolize their own mothers. They also make firm friends. 
Their philosophy of life combines an antibourgeois hedo-
nism with an absolute fearlessness of death in any form.
Though they differ widely in conduct and aims, massacres 
and sicario killings share several defining characteristics:
•  Both are organized undertakings that presuppose a 
high degree of planning, preparation, and coordinated 
action. The initiative of an individual or a handful of 
people does not usually suffice. Rather, the cooperation 
of a larger group, a team, is required to carry out opera-
tions of this kind.
•  This is also reflected in the cold-bloodedness and 
professionalism with which victims are executed. Pleas 
for quarter or mercy fall on deaf ears. At most they trig-
ger scornful incomprehension. This indicates that the 
actual act of killing is preceded by a mental dehuman-
ization of the victims, who before they are killed are no 
longer counted as human. (Uribe (2004, 75) particu-
larly emphasizes this aspect.)
•  Thus the perpetrators and the people behind them 
scorn all the Western world’s humanitarian criteria. 
They apparently live in an enclave that has abandoned 
the shared values of the civilized world, one where the 
fundamental values of respect for physical integrity of 
others, compassion, and elementary social solidarity 
have been suspended.
Disregard for the life of others is also reflected in the 
structure of the acts of violence as experienced by the 
victims. Two features are particularly striking:
•  The first is the unpredictable and arbitrary way in 
which the calamity befalls the victims. They are left no 
time to prepare themselves either inwardly or out-
wardly for their imminent fate. There is no question of 
a humane death. What is more, their corpses are often 
subjected to additional maltreatment.
•  Second, the means are often glaringly disproportion-
ate to the ends.10 This is especially evident in the case 
of massacres, where the mere suspicion that a social 
group or village has cooperated with the opposing side 
suffices to gun down indiscriminately all inhabitants 
of a particular settlement. In the case of the sicariato, 
the disproportion is based on the fact that human life 
has become a mere marketable commodity. Everyone 
has his or her price. The possibility of buying the death 
of any chosen person has considerably expanded the 
circle of potential initiators of violence. If someone is 
out to kill another person, he or she no longer has to 
overcome the inhibitions that prevent most people from 
committing acts of violence themselves. He or she just 
has to engage a routine killer who does not even require 
an explanation of the motive for the murderous plan.
Both the massacre and the setting up of assassination agen-
cies are extreme cases of the use of violence for specific 
purposes, in the former case to demonstrate and assert 
power, in the latter to secure material gain. At the same time, 
however, they transcend these ends, undermining them 
in the process. What lesson is the general population of a 
province or region meant to learn when entire villages are 
extinguished on the pretext of complicity with one of the 
warring camps? And what is the appropriate price for an act 
of violence aimed at gunning down an unsuspecting person 
from behind on the street? In many cases, violence has ob-
viously become detached from its purpose and has become 
an end in itself. Massacres are for the most part bloody 
ritual sacrifices without any further-reaching symbolic 
value, in which the butchers celebrate themselves and their 
gruesome deeds.11 The same goes for the parties that a gang 
of sicarios holds to mark the completion of a “successful,” 
well paid contract killing. Here, too, only superficial homage 
is paid to life and its pleasures, while the underlying tone is 
of a death cult and a vague awareness of their own mortality.
10 Sánchez (2003, 55) talks in this connection 
about the triumph of means over ends («… los 
métodos se imponen sobre los objetivos»).
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The final shared feature of massacres and paid contract kill-
ings is the perpetrator structure. In both cases, the killers 
are mainly young men from the lower class aged between 
fifteen and thirty who have trouble finding a regular job 
or simply prefer to earn a relatively easy living from the 
business of violence. However, this common feature should 
not be overestimated. After all, the young men in each case 
are only the last link in a chain of middlemen and spon-
sors, some of whom are from completely different social 
strata. The organized nature of both extreme forms of 
violence means that each is integrated into extensive social 
networks. Therefore it is not enough to hold the “militia sol-
diers” and paid “killers” who actually carry out the violent 
work primarily responsible for inhuman acts of violence. 
They are only the most visible representatives of a multitude 
of different groups and organizations that support, provide 
cover for, and in some cases also finance these practices 
because they profit from them in one way or another.
A much more difficult question is whether and to what 
extent the wider public – the man on the street and the 
media – approves of these excessive forms of violence. 
Why is there no public denunciation of assassination agen-
cies, when the location of their headquarters is common 
knowledge? Why do attempts by the paramilitaries, who 
are widely known to be responsible for most massacres, to 
become reputable and gain recognition as a political force, 
not encounter more protest?12 These questions are difficult 
to answer. On the one hand, popular sayings such as «por 
algo sera» (“it will be for something,” in other words, “he 
won’t have been killed for nothing”) and «el que la debe 
la paga» (“he who has a debt pays it”) point to a very wide 
general tolerance of even gruesome and apparently unjust 
acts of violence. On the other hand, Colombia has always 
had groups of people who insist on compliance with inter-
national humanitarian law, and victims’ associations have 
repeatedly called for the guilty to be punished. However, 
in a general atmosphere of mistrust and intimidation, ex-
pectations as regards the population’s willingness to mobi-
lize and protest should not be set too high. To some extent, 
public opinion probably fluctuates depending on the 
events and the political constellation. Spectacular murders 
or a rash of cynical massacres provoke outrage and focus 
people’s wrath on the perpetrators. However, if the latter 
signal willingness to compromise and signs emerge of 
a possible end to the conflict, the majority of people are 
prepared to brush aside past crimes against humanity in 
order to reach an amicable, peaceful solution.
Looking for an Explanation
Much consideration has been given to the causes of 
violence and an eventual culture of violence in Colombia, 
and much has been written. I will therefore confine myself 
here to giving a brief account of the most important ex-
planatory factors, disregarding cultural variables in order 
to avoid the trap of a tautological circular argument.
Generally, the lack of a state monopoly of violence in 
Colombia counts as one of the main reasons for violence 
running out of hand.13 Some say that the state relin-
quished this monopoly only in recent times. However, this 
overlooks the fact that ever since the state of Colombia 
was founded, the country’s political elites have not only 
been unable to secure for it the sole power of disposal 
over physical means of force, but have not even tried in 
earnest to enforce this monopoly. The scope of the central 
state enforcement and security apparatus has remained 
decidedly modest. Evidently, the state’s leaders shunned 
the cost of maintaining stronger armed forces, preferring 
instead to wage conflicts using ad hoc militias recruited 
on a voluntary basis (Krumwiede 1980, 79ff ). Looking at 
earlier European history, we see that elimination contests 
between regional princes generally led to an increasing 
concentration of military and political power, until all do-
minion was concentrated in a single institution, the state. 
In contrast, regional conflicts in Colombia, of which there 
were a good number, always ended in an arrangement, a 
compromise, that left existing decentralized structures in-
11 Uribe (2004 21), too, denies that massacres have 
any symbolic significance. 
 
12 The paramilitaries, for their part, complain that 
the state that created and supported them suddenly 
wants nothing more to do with them. 
«Y ahora dirán que el papá no va a responder por 
el muchachito – les va a tocar ver que hacen con el 
hijo de Herman Moster que crearon,» El Tiempo, 
May 16, 2004, 6. On the “reintegration” of the 
paramilitaries see Catedra Konrad Adenauer de 
Comunicación y Democracia 2004.
13 Kurtenbach (1999, esp. 396f.) states that the 
Colombian state has secured a monopoly neither 
on violence nor on taxes. See also Waldmann 1997, 
145 f., 149f.
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tact. It is also noticeable that – unlike the sixteenth-centu-
ry religious wars in Europe – the nineteenth-century civil 
wars in Colombia, which at least in terms of their rhetoric 
were certainly comparable with the former, produced 
no impartial force obligated only to the good of the state 
and the common good.14 Instead, they led to a perpetua-
tion and consolidation of the friend-foe dichotomy until 
it finally became the shared mental property of all social 
classes. To summarize, the Colombian state is certainly 
present in public consciousness as an intellectual and 
physical entity, but it has remained a weak state incapable 
of enforcing the laws it passes and incapable of disciplin-
ing its own officials and citizens. Though it may be able 
to establish a certain degree of public order, its power is 
insufficient to guarantee public security, which as Hobbes 
said is the most important good for everyone.
The main initiative within Colombia’s political system still 
lies with the two traditional political parties, Conserva-
tives and Liberals. Generally speaking, the dominant axis 
of conflict in this country is “horizontal” (conflict between 
political parties, between armed actors such as guerrilla 
organizations and paramilitary associations, etc.) as op-
posed to the “vertical” relations of power between the state 
and its citizens. Some interesting analyses of the different 
implications of horizontal, “symmetrical” violent conflicts 
and vertical, “asymmetrical” conflict constellations have 
been published recently. Iván Orozco in particular has 
given much consideration to this topic (Sánchez 2003, 58ff; 
Orozco Abad 200515). He writes that the circumstances 
are significantly clearer in the case of vertical abuse of 
power, vertical “barbarisms” as he puts it, of the kind cus-
tomarily perpetrated by authoritarian or totalitarian states, 
than in the case of “barbarisms” committed in the context 
of horizontal conflicts, for instance during civil wars. This 
applies first to the extent of the groups involved in the 
misuse of violence, which in the case of violent excesses 
committed by the state tends to be limited, secondly to 
role differentiation between perpetrator and victim, which 
in this case are clearly separated, and thirdly to the dura-
tion of violent processes of this kind, which are temporally 
limited. In the case of horizontal, “symmetrical” violent 
conflicts, everything is much more complicated. First, 
they engender greater mobilization, i.e. broader sections 
of the population become involved in them in one way or 
another. Where armed confrontations are of longer dura-
tion, this in turn makes it difficult to draw a clear separat-
ing line between “perpetrators” and “victims,”because an 
individual can alternate between the two roles depending 
on the conflict constellation and power relations. Finally, 
it is difficult to bring civil-war-like conflicts to a definitive 
conclusion. If those who have committed serious hu-
man rights violations during the fighting face the threat 
of criminal proceedings after its cessation, in case of 
doubt they will prefer to carry on fighting. Yet if they are 
granted an amnesty the misuse of violence goes appar-
ently unpunished and there is the risk of violence flaring 
up again at the first opportunity. Orozco summarizes the 
dilemma facing responsible statesmen and peacemakers in 
civil wars or civil-war-like situations in terms of the need 
to make a twofold transition (Ibid., 27).16 The dilemma is 
how to achieve peace on the one hand while on the other 
effecting the transition from a state of lawlessness and 
authoritarianism to a democracy under the rule of law. 
In any case, Orozco’s studies show that the dynamics of 
violence emanating from the horizontal conflict constella-
tions characteristic of Colombia are much harder to check 
and “rein in” than asymmetrical, vertical “barbarisms.”
A third complex of causes that has recently escalated the 
violence and fostered a generalization of the culture of 
violence is the narcotics trade. Most experts agree that the 
production of and trade in narcotics has broken the long-
standing tie between violence and party politics, leading 
to a situation where violence has penetrated all areas of life 
as a means of power and enforcement (Pécaut 2001, 103 ff.; 
Kurtenbach 1999, 387 ff. with reasons). In other words, the 
drugs trade has turned violence into something banal 
14 The state, and the state security forces, were 
always involved, and were often especially brutal. 
On the role of the police and the army during 
La Violencia see Sánchez and Meertens 1983, 75. 
For the development of the army in general see 
Gilhodes 1986.
15 The subsequent comments refer primarily to the 
first chapter of the book, “La Barbarie Horizon-
tal,” which the author saw first as a manuscript in 
English.
16 Orozco’s line of thought is only very roughly 
outlined here. The author does not claim to have 
done justice to the complexity of his arguments.
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and commonplace. This happened for a variety of reasons, 
among others because a rare, coveted commodity like co-
caine inevitably incites competition for its possession and 
because the profit that this lucrative trade yields makes it 
easy to recruit young men who definitely prefer easy work 
with a weapon to a monotonous, badly paid job in some 
other business. Probably the most important structural 
reason is that there are no binding informal rules govern-
ing dealings between leading figures in the drugs trade, 
so there is no basis for mutual trust. This forces each to 
acquire a private army as a potential threat in order to 
ensure that agreements are observed.
I will tentatively mention a fourth possible complex of 
reasons for violence and a culture of violence in Co-
lombia. This is the continuing marked tension between 
the upper and the lower class, combined with an inad-
equately developed middle class and urban middle-class 
culture.17 In doing so, my starting assumption is that in 
general – and especially in rural areas where the state is 
hardly present – both the big landowning class and the 
class of small farmers and agricultural laborers share a 
predominantly instrumental, pragmatic understanding of 
violence. Colombia’s agrarian history has seen numerous 
violent confrontations between, and within, these classes in 
which legal considerations certainly carried weight but the 
availability of means of coercion determined the ultimate 
outcome (Le Grand 1986). In Latin America in general, 
consistent condemnation of violence and its banishment 
from public life did not come about until urbanization 
processes established the urban lifestyle, and in many cases 
this applied only in the cities for a long time.18 Within the 
cities, in turn, it was primarily the middle classes who, due 
to their specific resources (they had educational goods and 
professional knowledge at their disposal, but little expertise 
in the use of physical force), their socialization and their 
general orientation, had the greatest interest in the emer-
gence of non-violent spaces governed by the rule of law.
The author suspects that in Colombia this kind of genuine-
ly urban ambience that rolls back violence to the margins 
emerged only at a relatively late stage, and never to its full 
extent. There is no lack of testimony to art and culture 
in the country’s major cities, from impressive works of 
architecture to a flourishing publishing industry and nu-
merous universities, of which not a few are of an excellent 
standard. However, one cannot avoid the impression that 
many lower class migrants from the countryside have only 
completed the urbanization process half-heartedly and 
that their mentality, and this also applies to other classes, 
has remained rural and parochial in some important 
respects. Class struggles in the city are still fought in a 
rough, physical manner and there is hardly any question 
of their being switched to a more symbolic plane. As yet, 
no typically urban middle-class political party exists. Pop-
ulist revolutions, a typically urban phenomenon through-
out Latin America, have never taken place. The traditional 
parties – born in a predominantly rural context – along 
with their clientelist appendages still have the say.
The urbanization process the country has undergone in 
recent decades has not actually suppressed violence as 
a means of conflict resolution, but has only changed its 
appearance. It is no longer openly on show and no longer 
employed visibly as a means of domination and strength. 
Nobody in the central districts of the big cities disputes 
the right of the state and local authorities to keep the 
public peace and general order. Yet violent plots are still 
hatched covertly in back rooms. In the cities people are 
killed or kidnapped on a daily basis, while in areas on the 
urban periphery the law of the jungle prevails in any case. 
Violence has become more anonymous and selective, but 
whether it has declined during the course of the urbaniza-
tion and modernization process is an open question that 
should probably be answered in the negative.
This article has shown that the incidence of violence in Co-
lombia cannot be comprehended without understanding 
the existence of a culture of violence as expressed in high 
17 It should be noted that although there is a large 
degree of social inequality as measured by the Gini 
index, for example, it does not exceed the custom-
ary dimensions in other Latin American countries 
(Bulmer-Thomas 2003, 11).
18 The author is thinking primarily of the Cono 
Sur, of Chile and Argentina for instance.
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homicide rates, the existence of institutionalized violent 
actors, the prevalence of certain norms such as those of 
the macho and of revenge, and the absence of other norms, 
taboos, and prohibitive rules. The ubiquity of violence is 
not plausible unless a propensity to violence is sociocul-
turally anchored. In this respect, the hypothesis that a cul-
ture of violence exists is helpful in explaining conditions 
in Colombia, and the culture of violence can been seen as 
a causal factor. Nonetheless, this is not to assert that when 
seeking explanations one can stop at culture. For culture 
itself is determined by historical and contemporary fac-
tors: by the lack of a state monopoly of violence, by the 
dominance of horizontal axes of conflict, by the rules of 
the narcotics trade (which creates strong economic incen-
tives for excessive use of violence), and by the class struc-
ture of Colombian society, which is characterized by class 
tensions combined with a weakly developed urban middle 
class. In this respect, the culture of violence in turn is only 
a dependent variable that requires explanation. Cause 
and effect interact and interweave. Since the real practice 
of violence as perceived by social actors shapes social 
expectations of behavior, influences definitions of cost and 
risk, etc., it sets cultural parameters. And in this cultural 
environment violence is more likely to be used.
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Appendix: Homicide Statistics in Colombia and South America
Peter Waldmann
em.waldmann@phil.uni-augsburg.de
Crude rates of homicide in the Americas (per 100,000)
Country Last available year bet-
ween 1988 and 1995
Last available year bet-






Costa Rica 3.7 5.3
Cuba 7.3 6.6
Ecuador* 12.6 12.3
El Salvador* 39.9 40.9
United States* 10.1 8.2
Honduras not available not available
Guatemala* 25.3 2.2






Peru 2.9 not available
Puerto Rico* 23.2 22.4
Dominican Republic not available 12.2
Uruguay 4.3 4.4
Trinidad and Tobago* 8.0 11.1
Venezuela* 11.2 13.5
Average* 14.7 14.7
* Rates higher than 10 per 100,000 people are considered high and are printed in bold.
† Country with the highest rates in the Americas.
Source: Bergquist et al. 2001, 276.











as a proportion of 
the total number 
(%)
1997 25,379 63 3,730 14.7
1998 23,096 56 3,633 15.7
1999 24,358 59 4,003 16.4
2000 26,540 63 6,987 26.3
2001 27,841 65 7,637 27.4
2002 28,780 66 4,625 21.4
Source: Pizarro Leon Gómez 2004
